Posted by: Vikram | January 24, 2014

AAP and the third democratic upsurge

This blog has emphasized the historical truth that Indian democracy is a grand social experiment, the implantation of a democratic government in an undemocratic society. Three days before Republic Day is perhaps a good time to remind us of Dr. Ambedkar’s prescient words,

On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions?

The Constitution makers were well aware of these contradictions and believed that a combination of universal suffrage and legally guaranteed liberty would gradually democratize Indian society. Indeed, this has happened, but perhaps it has not happened in the way they imagined and to the extent that they had hoped. Along with the gradual spread of democratic expectations, there have been major ‘democratic upsurges’ which have decisively transformed Indian politics in a few years, but large populations still remain voiceless.

The first democratic upsurge occurred in the 70s with the emergency and collapse of Congress rule. Politically, this had the consequence of a non-Congress coalition ruling India for the first time since independence. Socially, it led to the transfer of political power from the upper caste Hindus who had dominated the Congress since its inception to the intermediate peasant castes, today called the OBCs or the Other Backward Castes. The second democratic upsurge, which began in the late 80s, brought the Dalits into the political mainstream as an independent force. By 2007, the Dalit controlled BSP ruled India’s largest state. However, the economic and social transformation of the second democratic upsurge is far from complete, with the Dalits continuing to face marginalization and violence, mainly from the OBCs.

It now appears that by the early 2010s, metro India’s neo-middle class was ready to enter politics with its own voice. During the India Against Corruption agitation, Ashis Nandy noted that middle class India was now a mass and wanted to play a bigger role in the country’s politics through its media clout. The key intervention of the AAP has been to combine this new middle class clout with the numbers and anger of Delhi’s working class to produce a transparent, non-sectarian urban political coalition.

However, it is important to emphasize that the AAP as it exists currently cannot call itself the third democratic upsurge. On observing India’s social structure and past democratic upsurges, it is clear that the groups most urgently needing a political voice are the marginalized adivasis in Central India, and the variegated populations at the peripheries of the Indian federation, who are living under quasi military-rule. The arrogant and short sighted policies of the GoI, and the emergence of violent extremists as the major political force representing these populations has created an unprecedented crisis in Indian democracy.

Producing the third democratic upsurge will clearly be a formidable task. The peripheral location, and secessionist tendencies of these groups means that the mainstream has come to see these issues as one of national integrity. There are some positive signs however, for example, the formation of the North East Regional Parties Front, and the 39 MPs from there speaking with unison on certain issues. Sooner or later, one hopes, the violence will subside opening up the space for saner voices.

Can AAP play a part in this opening up ? This is a tantalizing possibility, but one that is not very likely. One simply cant see AAP succeeding in India’s peripheries, where issues regarding identity are quite nuanced, and whose politics is quite unfamiliar to the ‘mainlander’ dominated AAP. However, AAP might be able to make an impact in India’s tribal belt. Perhaps the AAP can take an aim at the seats reserved for the STs in states like Gujarat and Rajasthan, where the Maoists have had little impact, and a plethora of NGOs have found space to work with tribal populations. Indeed, a party with MPs only from the metros and tribal areas seems strange. But we must not forget that, the non-sectarian coalition between Delhi’s middle classes and working classes was almost unimaginable a few months ago, yet it now rules Delhi.

In the ideal scenario, one hopes that the emergence of an independent, non-violent political force in some tribal areas will push the Maoists to the political margins in states like Chhattisgarh, and create the space for these communities to have a stronger voice in Indian democracy’s shouting well.

Posted by: Vikram | November 9, 2013

The puzzle of arrested development in India

I recently heard the webcast of a talk by Abhimanyu Singh, an IAS officer who later joined UNESCO to work on literacy and is currently the director of UNSECO-Beijing. Comparisons between India and China are frequent, but Singh clearly and powerfully brought out how comprehensively China had outdone India when it came to literacy, especially female literacy. China’s adult female literacy rate is a whopping 40 % more than India’s. No surprise then, that Chinese women are far more likely to be part of the productive workforce than Indian women. Another powerful statistic, the most illiterate province in China is Tibet with 32 % illiteracy and a population of about 3 million. There are five Indian states still below this mark (including Andhra from the ‘developed’ South), with a combined population of about 300 million people !

The great thing about his talk was not only did he present data, but he gave a detailed historical overview as to why he thought China had done so well and India lagged behind. Perhaps, as he was speaking to an audience of educators, he focused on the legal and political regime in China that enabled it to prioritize mass education, and the differences in the legal regime in India. For example, in China childhood and adult education became compulsory and mandatory soon after the PRC gained power. In contrast, in India universal childhood education was only included in the non-binding Directive Principles of State Policy, and only in 2010 did education become a Constitutional right.

I am curious about why there was no societal and electoral pressure on the Indian state to prioritize education and other social goods after independence. Singh mentioned a book ‘The Child and the State in India‘ by Myron Weiner, which inquired into the question of arrested development in India. A review of the book summarizes its conclusion in the following way,

India’s educational expenditure as a proportion of gross national product is not exceptionally low: … It is not the capacity to do more that is lacking, in Weiner’s view, but the will. He locates the principal explanation for poor performance in primary education in the belief systems of the state bureaucracy—”a set of beliefs that are widely shared by educators, social activists, trade unionists, academic researchers, and, more broadly, by members of the Indian middle class”.

An astonishing constellation of forces is seemingly arrayed against compulsory education, …. these include the small businessmen who employ child workers, Gandhian supporters of cottage industry, upper caste groups fearing competition for jobs and the disappearance of a menial class, and often parents themselves, whether in exigent need or believing in their right to their children’s labor. On the education side, opponents of compulsion include teachers (who benefit from large student enrollment but low attendance), state education department officials (for reasons Weiner does not make wholly clear), and Illich-style enthusiasts for “deschooling.” Indeed, Weiner claims to find no significant forces for compulsory education.

In short, the reviewer says, “Mass schooling is subversive of the social order.” But why was there no desire to subvert the social order ? This assertion contrasts greatly to the politics of the freedom struggle and the mood of India on the eve of independence as described by British historian Yasmin Khan,

It is difficult to exaggerate the turmoil that India was experiencing at the close of the Second World War and the sense of entitlement and hope that had fired the imagination of the people. … The newest aspect of 1946 was the fusion of so many different movements, some urban, some rural, some violent, and some law-abiding, many of which were explicitly directed against British rule while others, led by rebels, targeted exploitative Indian landlords, loan sharks, autocratic princes and existing social dynamics more broadly. The one thing in common was a feeling of resistance to the status quo.

So where did all this revolutionary energy go ? Khan mentions that the Congress’s four-anna membership regime allowed all and sundry to join the party and perhaps dilute its subversive potential. But the debates of the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution itself, the passing of the Hindu Code Bills and the abolition of zamindari indicate that the post-independence Indian polity was not conservative. Did the partition horrors exhaust people so thoroughly that they no longer had the energy to push on and continue subverting the social order ? Or did the highly fractionalized caste nature of inequality diffuse these energies and just result in very modest gains overall ?

Posted by: Vikram | September 12, 2013

Jinnah’s lesson for India

Few words are abhorred more by the Indian mainstream than this statement by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, delivered during his presidential address to the Muslim League in 1940,

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, litterateurs. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspect on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes.

Although exaggerated, any dispassionate analyst will clearly see the kernel of truth in this statement. However what is eminently contestable is Jinnah’s conclusion,

To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state.

Jinnah was wrong about this in 1940, and he remains wrong about it in 2013. Modern India, with all its communal problems and right-wing fanatics has not come anywhere close to final destruction. Indeed, the greatest security threat identified by the Indian Prime Minister is the Maoist rebellion, a secular, class-based struggle, not Hindu-Muslim conflict.

But we must recognize that this statement was not the basis of Jinnah’s politics with the Muslim League. The path towards Pakistan was not started on the idea of irreconcilable cultural differences between any two sets of people. Jinnah faced the issue of a Muslim minority in a Hindu majority country, and an active, extremist Hindu right wing. The Congress party, which claimed to speak for all Indians, had managed to keep this extremist section on the fringes. The stalwarts of the Indian Independence movement, Nehru, Patel, Tagore, were either dismissive of this extremist section or mildly indulgent of it. Ambedkar, scathing as he was on Hindu orthodoxy, was unsympathetic to Jinnah’s cause. Only Gandhi remained steadfast in his vision of Hindu-Muslim unity. But politics for the Mahatma was based in moral and ethical example, not the technical Constitutional arrangements sought by Jinnah.

So Jinnah did not utter those words out of a belief in everlasting Hindu-Muslim conflict. He had a political objective and was employing cultural items to bolster his case before his constituents. It was a strategy that would backfire disastrously in the years to come, but that is a separate matter.

Had the leaders of independent India not agreed to linguistic states, one would not have been surprised to see similar statements contrasting Tamils with other Indians. Such sentiments also come up in the Kashmir and North-Eastern debates, where cultural, and even physiological differences are used to buttress what really are political disputes. On account of its tremendous diversity, and its highly centralized government, the Indian Union will continue to face such issues. Today, ‘national’ parties gather less than 50 % of the votes at the polls. The Delhi-Bombay-Bangalore crowd laments this ‘regionalism’ and equates it with ‘corruption’ and ‘misgovernance’. However, whatever one’s feelings towards Jinnah, we can take lessons from his role during the final stages of the freedom struggle. India’s success depends on due recognition of federal issues and flexibility in handling them; democracy does not end with one-person, one-vote.

Posted by: Vikram | September 2, 2013

Why Mumbai should not be its own state

Over at his blog, Dr. Ajay Shah has speculated that being part of Maharashtra is one of the reasons for Mumbai’s decline. Some claim, that had Mumbai been a full fledged state like Delhi is, it would have been better governed. The example of Delhi is indeed tempting. Notwithstanding the grave problems of crime and sexual violence, Delhi’s infrastructure, its roads and the metro system are admirable. Also, the independent and influential nature of Delhi’s universities is nowhere to be seen in the universities of Mumbai. However, despite these pluses, one can argue that decoupling a state from its metro city can be fatal to its cultural life and also hinder overall development.

Contrary to what many of the Bombay-Delhi-Bangalore folks assume, the capital of an Indian state is not simply an administrative outpost of the ‘centre’. Chennai, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Kolkata and Bengaluru have pivotal roles in creating modern cultures from pre-existing linguistic and relgious identities. Can one imagine an ‘EU governed’ Paris ? London as an ‘European Union territory’ ? It seems that India’s urban elite are acutely aware of how Paris makes France French, but refuse to acknowledge what Mumbai means to Maharashtrians. Creating a modern culture from the living traditions of the subcontinent requires the intersection of cultural and financial capital. And that intersection can only occur if these cities are tied to their states as their capitals.

Not only is such reasoning limited if one considers the cultural connection between a state and its capital, it is also flawed from the developmental point of view. For example, 70 % of the revenue of the state of Andhra Pradesh comes from the city of Hyderabad. The numbers will be similar for Mumbai and Maharashtra, Bengaluru and Karnataka and so on. Every state in India that has a major metro as its capital has a Human Development Index (HDI) above the national average. Or put in another way, every major state with no major metro area in it has a very low HDI. The biggest cities in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are less than half the size of even the smallest metro city. Some might point to Kerala, a state with no major metros but with relatively high living standards. However, Kerala is intimately tied with the middle Eastern metros like Dubai and Abu Dhabi via its massive Gulf diaspora. In 2003, this diaspora’s contribution to Kerala included,

remittances [which] were 1.74 times the revenue receipts of the state, 7 times of the transfers to the state from the Central Government and 1.8 times the annual expenditure of the Kerala Government and were 15 to 18 times the size of foreign exchange earned from the export of cashew and marine products.

Of course, the low HDI of the BIMARU states is a very complex issue. But the lack of a major metropolis tied intimately to the state could be one of the reasons for the enduring economic problems of those states.

Mumbai has more than twice the per capita income of Hanoi, the capital city of Vietnam. But Hanoi is a far cleaner city with poverty almost absent. Obviously governance plays a big part in Mumbai’s pathetic state. But the roots of this governance failure might lie in the distance between the elites of Mumbai from the masses of Maharashtra’s hinterland. Bollywood is now mainly a vehicle of middle class jingoism and corporate advertising. Hardly any literature is produced by the elites that can bind them to the masses. They prefer to write for the Booker and Pulitzer. To attain the greatness that Mumbai surely deserves, it is Mumbai’s elites who have to end their secession from the real India, not get Mumbai to secede from Maharashtra.

Auto-driver’s daughter tops national CA exam“, “Hawker’s son clears IIT-JEE“, “Bidi labourer’s daughter clears UPSC exam“. April-May is the exam result season in India, and one invariably finds news headlines about such fantastic individual accomplishments. Indeed, clearing such demanding exams is a major accomplishment, and to do so with all the odds stacked against oneself is nothing short of remarkable. However, the response of the India’s middle classes and elites to such news deserves some scrutiny. It is one thing to be inspired by such achievements, but quite another to hold these rare events as triumphs of ‘merit’, as opposed to something else (aka reservations).

First, even if the triumph of ‘merit’ claim had any statistical backing (it doesnt, as we will see in a bit), being asked to clear extremely competitive exams to simply achieve a decent middle-class existence is not exactly fair. The workers that entered the middle class on the back of the automotive and other manufacturing industries in the US, and the factory workers moving out of poverty in modern China did not have to clear any competitive exams. These hyper-competitive exams are really the gateway to the elite and upper middle class worlds, sometimes the poor can get in through sheer grit and brilliance, but it is mostly a gateway to which only the middle classes have access.

To see this, we need to see where the vast majority of the people who clear these exams come from. 56 % of the successful IIT candidates came from the CBSE board, whereas only 5% of the total student body is enrolled in that board. Indeed, the CBSE board schools have traditionally been reserved for employees of the Central Government, although now they are the board of choice for the general middle class. Based on anecdotal observations, if we consider the set of students enrolled having a parent employed in a Government service (which cannot be more than 10% of the population), the vast majority of the successful candidates of the IIT, CA and UPSC exams will have such a background. So yes, the one odd poor student clears the exam, but the 99 other clearers are from the middle classes with educated parents.

So why does the middle class celebrate the achievements of these marginalized students ? After all, for most of the year,  it shows nothing but disdain for their ‘vernacular’ and ‘regional’ culture, and seeks to sequester itself from them by building gated communities and barricading public spaces for its own use. The answer is perhaps related to the mythologies of hard work and perseverance that middle classes around the world construct around themselves. Be it America, Brazil or India, the not quite elite and definitely not poor sections of society seek to create a discourse that legitimizes their own position of relative privilege in the society. By pointing out the ‘merit’ in the achievements of these marginalized students, the middle class is pointing to its own ‘merit’ and pointing to the ‘non-merit’ness of the reserved candidates, and the remaining poor.

More broadly, this celebration of merit is also a subtle endorsement of the status quo, notwithstanding how clearly unfair it is to the marginalized. The middle class is telling the marginalized, “Look its possible to move up the ladder, you just need to work hard enough.” Perhaps, it is time for the marginalized to tell the privileged sections, “If only the contractors who employ us to build your houses, paid us the salaries that we are due, factory owners compensated us fairly for the limbs we loose making your appliances and toys, doctors and teachers provide us with the essential services that both you and we paid taxes for, there would be fewer poor to ‘celebrate’ the achievements of.”

Posted by: Vikram | April 7, 2013

More on the flailing Indian state

The capacity of the Indian state to carry out its functions has been discussed earlier on this blog. Lant Pritchett in his paper “Is India a flailing state ?” points out ,

My impression from three years of living in India was that it was striking of how much of the intellectual discussion around policy and priorities looked entirely conventional, with the usual left-right splits about what the government “should” do, argued out, particularly among in the English language media I was exposed to, as if the government of India could do roughly whatever it was proposed they should do.

Clearly India suffers from severely deficient parameters on health, law enforcement and education. The state’s failures to provide basic healthcare are reflected in the low life expectancy, the daily reports of rapes and crimes point to the ineffective rule of law, and survey after survey reminds us of the appalling learning levels among Indian school children. What is striking is the fact that at the very top of India’s administrative and political pyramid, there has been a great consensus on improving health and education. Project after project has been brainstormed, thought out and funded handsomely to improve these basic indicators, with very little to show for. Why is this so ?

Beyond Corruption

The classic middle class response to this question, goes something like this. Money is allocated by the government, but ‘corrupt’ officials siphon off almost everything and it makes no impact. This conveniently made claim (buttressed by daily reports of egregious corruption in an unimaginably vast country) lays the blame at the moral failure of the political and administrative class. However, it cannot stand up to deeper scrutiny. Many other developing countries have as much or even much more corruption than India, but they do far better than India on these basic indicators. For example, Iraq, a country that has been the unfortunate victim of a dictator, then a long period of turmoil, and now a weak government and a continuing civil war, has a higher life expectancy than India. We clearly have to look for answers beyond corruption.

A Question of Capacity

The key point Lant Pritchett makes, and one we should pay careful attention to is that in India’s current situation, understanding what the government can do, is atleast as important as thinking about what the government should do. In his paper, Pritchett studies the behavior of government agents at the base level of the state, and concludes that their indiscipline and indifference to their duties is to blame. But the issue might be even more fundamental. It appears that the Indian state simply does not have enough personnel to perform the tasks of a basic modern nation state. The shortfall in personnel is not a matter of operating at half or even quarter of the required workforce in India, in certain areas the Indian state doesnt even have a tenth of the workers it needs to have to perform fundamental functions. Consider these facts:

  1.  “India has 1,622.8 government servants for every 100,000 residents. In stark contrast, the U.S. has 7,681. The Central government, with 3.1 million employees, thus has 257 serving every 100,000 population, against the U.S. federal government’s 840.” - Praveen Swami in The Hindu.
  2. India had 9546 judges for a population of around a billion in the 90′s, at the same time, the US (which has a similar legal system) but a quarter of India’s population, had 28049 judges, more than three times as many. In other words, India has less than one-tenth the number of judges required to efficiently run the justice system. – John Armour & Priya Lele, – Law, Finance and Politics: The Case of India
  3. “On the basis of police per capita, India is the second lowest among 50 countries ranked using data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime from 2010. Police forces around the world are commonly measured as the number of police per 100,000 people, and India has 129. Only Uganda fares worse.” – The New York Times The world average is close to 350, and it is possible that India’s figure include the CRPF, which does not do any direct policing. Anecdotally, any Indian in the US will tell you that they see cop cars patrolling the street far more frequently than in India.

Set aside even the efficiency and morality of each public servant, the Indian state simply has nowhere near the number of personnel needed to perform its functions.

Show Me The Money

How did we end up in this scenario, and what needs to be done to rectify this ? Lets perform a simple calculation. Suppose we want to increase the number of judges in India, so that we have the same number of judges per capita as the US. How much more would the expenditure be ? Assume that each judge gets paid Rs. 50,000 as salary every month, thats Rs. 600000 a year, and that there are 10,000 judges, all getting the same salary. This is a total current expenditure of Rs. 600 cr a year. If we were to increase the number of judges by a factor of 10, the expenditure would be Rs. 6000 cr a year, i.e. we would have to arrange for Rs. 5400 cr more per year.

It is difficult for me to see how this money can be arranged without economic growth. In fact, I would speculate that one of the main reasons the Indian state is so understaffed is that the historically low rates of economic growth have constrained recruitment. Unfortunately, fast economic growth comes with its own challenges in a country with a weak rule of law and historical inequalities like India. The very policies that encourage faster economic expansion, translate into exploitation and abuse at the ground level due to the weak rule of law. A catch-22 seems to arise here, we need economic growth to be able to enforce the rule of law, but in the short term at least, that very same economic growth can make a mockery of the rule of law.

Posted by: Vikram | March 13, 2013

Who is Chikni Chameli ?

“Sab ko to parsaad baate, main maangu to mujhko daate” – Lyric from a recent Hindi song (Agent Vinod)

The new millennium has seen the establishment of a new device in Indian cinema, the ‘item girl’. It is interesting to speculate on the specific origins of the ‘item girl’ terminology. One possible source is the fact that young Indian men often call an attractive woman an ‘item’, reducing her personhood to a commodity in the most literal sense. It could also be an English translation of the ‘maal’ (thing) terminology used by Indian men in a similar context. Bollywood has featured attractive women and provocative female characters before, but the last decade has seen the ‘item girl’ and ‘item song’ becoming an attraction in themselves.

The typical ‘item girl’ in millennial Indian cinema has no past and no future. She has no relationships, no desires apart from gyrating for the pleasure of a few drunk men. Typically none of these drunk men who lust after her have any chance of ‘getting her’, only the hero is macho enough, but he is often not interested, most certainly not for the long term. After all, he has the cultured, coy and docile ‘typical Indian girl’ at home that he can order around and father respectable children with. Indeed, the ‘item girl’ phenomenon is a symptom of a severe moral crisis in Bollywood when it comes to dealing with women. Movie makers know that their consumers want to see sex and skin, but the lead actress cant be the one displaying this sexuality (atleast not outside the bonds of marriage), so in comes the slutty ‘item girl’ to the rescue.

So where do ‘Chikni Chameli’, ‘Sheila’ and ‘Munni’ come from ? They look too well nourished to come from our omnipresent slums. They most definitely do not come from our saas-bahu loving ‘middle class localities’. Actually, they come from much closer. Bollywood’s item girls are the produce of the dirty, patriarchal mind of the modern urban Indian male. The last two decades of liberalization have imparted Indian men with an ambiguous sense of sexual morality. Indian tradition ever only imposed constraints on Indian men’s sexuality in a weak sense. The ‘worst’ punishment for sexual transgressions for upper caste Hindu males was a hastily arranged marriage. For women, it was and still is death. What happened in the last 20 years ? Male sexuality has been almost completely released from even these weak bondages, young Indian men are no longer scared of their fathers and older relatives. There is a revolt against old expectations, but little reflection among men about their new expectations (see Jaa Chudail (Scram Witch) from execrable Delhi Belly below).

Jaa Chudail is one of a long line of Hindi songs that reflect the entrenched misogyny in the minds of Indian men, especially young, urban males. Mainstream Indian cinema of the last twenty years is a classic example of how a medium that could have ostensibly challenged sexual conventions (and indeed has, in the past done so) can be completely co-opted by the oppressive instincts of society. To be sure there are some brave exceptions, but it remains to be seen if they can shake up the current norm.

The impact of this new highly sexualized imagery of non-heroine women in Bollywood has been devastating for women and men of the working classes. In addition, the social legitimization of drinking has lead to widespread alcoholism among the underclass men, greatly increasing the dangers for the women who live with and around them. And limited job prospects, delayed age of marriage, lack of self-confidence and the underclass women’s inability to participate in romantic and sexual relationships due to severe social reprecussions, is leading to immense economic and sexual frustration.

It is critical to note the differing attitudes towards the sexuality of the lead actor’s wife, sister and Chikni Chameli. The lead actress seems more liberated, but stays within the boundaries of patriarchy, the sister’s sexuality is a threat and vulnerability to be guarded from opportunists, while Chikni Chameli is out there, a non-person, waiting to be taken advantage of. So ‘Chikni Chameli’ can be viewed as a construction of the elite Indian male mind, a construction that reflects its own sexual depravity and contempt of women, and projects it onto the mass medium to exploit and enhance the same tendencies in the minds of the masses.

Posted by: Vikram | February 12, 2013

Why India is so poor

First, the rural scenario

Imagine you live in a mid-western town in provincial America. Public transport is unheard of. Without a car, you are going nowhere. You cant go to work. You cant go to the doctor. Your economic and social prospects are pretty much nil. Basically, without a car you are condemned to poverty. So you say, the solution is simple enough, go buy one.

But you cant. Not because there are ‘too many people competing for a car’. Nor because the license officials are ‘corrupt’. Its because you are simply not allowed to. The people who own the existing cars just wont let you. They think you are only fit to chauffeur and clean their cars, not own one yourself. They want you to be dependent on them, so they can keep exploiting you. Some of the lucky ones can repair cars, so they have a slightly higher status, but they cant own one. This is enough, however, for them to think they are ‘superior’ to you and destroy any solidarity you could have built with them to challenge the car owning classes.

Replace car with land. And class with caste. And you will begin to understand the nature of economic relations in rural India. A highly centralized economy, with land ownership, access to irrigation and electricity concentrated in the hands of a landed elite. And a mass population condemned to be labourers, with virtually no control of their economic lives. Note that the issue here is not the scarcity of land. India has the second highest area of arable land in the world after America1, and its warmer climate is much more suitable to farming than America. The issue is the distribution of land. After successive rounds of very feeble land reform, the only major change in India’s rural economy is the transfer of some land ownership from the upper caste Hindus to the castes just below them. Even 65 years after Indian independence, the vast majority of the most marginalized in India, the Dalits and Adivasis remain de facto landless2.

A very in depth, localized study of this situation is provided in Dr. Jan Breman’s (University of Amsterdam) book: ‘The Poverty Regime in Village India‘. Based on half a century of work in rural Gujarat, the book presents a penetrating account of the oppressive economic and social relations in south Gujarat, especially between the marginalized tribal Halpatis and the ruling Anavil Brahmin caste. Breman’s contributions cannot be covered in a single blog post, but I will summarize two key observations here, first from the book itself,

The idea of undeserving poor has taken root in the minds of those who are rich, more in these years of reforms. The rich, thus, neither feel guilty nor are afraid of any mobilisation by the poor in acute destitution because of the absence of solidarity among them. The result is that the landless, footloose rural proletariat lead a nomadic existence, following the seasonal, sectoral, and local fluctuations in the economy with occupational multiplicity.

From a review of the book in the Frontline magazine3,

The book shows that the expectation that the landless would leave the village seeking better life in non-agricultural and urban occupations and relieve pressure on land did not happen. On the contrary, it shows the irrational phenomenon of people having land acquiring skills and moving to lucrative non-agricultural occupations without leaving their hold on their land. The landless poor thus suffer “double denial”.

Rural India faces an enormously centralized and unequal economy based on agriculture, with virtually no non-farm employment4. Poverty and mass distress migration are natural outcomes.

Urban woes

The picture in metro India looks very different on the surface, but has the same underlying structure. After independence, India adopted a heavily socialist, state led path to industrial economic growth. Economic power was thus concentrated in the hands of bureaucrats who enjoyed state sanctioned discretionary powers, the few urban classes that were already moneyed due to the industrial expansion during colonial rule and the elite politicians, who formed the link between the moneyed classes and the bureaucrats.

The result was extremely slow economic growth rates and immense economic frustration among the newly educated classes. These new classes found themselves in an economy where they were neither able to start new economic activity, and were at the mercy of the business owning classes and bureaucrats despite their often superior skills. This drove the aspirational migration of the educated classes to the West (especially the US), where the freer market was better able to compensate and utilize their skills.

Distribution of GDP between the public and private sector in India 1961-1999
Source: ‘Why Ethnic Parties Succeed’, Kanchan Chandra, Pg 117

The 1990s brought a change in the structure of the urban economy in India. The dismantling of the infamous license raj opened the doors for the educated classes to create new businesses and the entry of multinationals has allowed them to access new jobs. However, it remains hard to start a business, and poor infrastructure continues to hamper the economic prospects of urban India.

On the other hand, the rural economy hasnt seen much change at all. Land distribution remains brutally unequal, and in addition the demand for land and other rural resources to fuel the economic expansion of the urban areas has led to further moves to centralize economic power in the rural context. Take for example, the recent move by the PMO to take away the power of approval granted to the village gram sabhas in matters of acquiring forest land, blatantly against the spirit of the Forest Rights Act5,
“The PMO-driven report required the environment ministry to change its August 2009 order—removing the clause that makes it mandatory for the state government to provide written consent from the project affected gram sabhas that all claims under the Forest Rights Act had been settled and that they approved of the diversion of forest land.”

India’s poverty is thus driven by extreme centralization of economic power. And this centralization is based on an unequal social and political contract between the ruling classes and the masses, not on any fundamental resource pressures or corruption.

References:

1:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use_statistics_by_country
2:”According to the draft paper of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, 77% of dalits and 90% of adivasis are either ‘absolute landless’ (own no land) or ‘mere landless’.”http://www.empowerpoor.org/backgrounder.asp?report=162
3:Anatomy of Poverty, http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=20080201506207600.htm&date=fl2502/&prd=fline&
4:”The dynamic rural nonfarm sector in China has been a major contributor to the country’s remarkable growth, while in India the growth in output and employment in this sector has been rather stagnant.” http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/dsgdp24.pdf
5: Diversion of forest land for industrial use may delay as environment ministry seeks time for consultations http://m.economictimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/diversion-of-forest-land-for-industrial-use-may-delay-as-environment-ministry-seeks-time-for-consultations/articleshow/18127015.cms


(हिंदी मैं गलतियो के लिए माफ़ी चाहता हू )

आज़ादी के संघर्ष में भारत की महिलाओं ने बराबर का योगदान दिया । बहुत सारी महिलओं ने नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस की आजाद हिन्द फ़ौज के ‘झाँसी की रानी’ सेन्य दल में अपनी जान की बाज़ी भी लगा दी। मगर आजाद हिंदुस्तान का सपना यह तो नहीं था, की समाज में लड़कियो पर अत्यचरो के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने के लिए, एक युविका को शहादत देनी पड़े। हमें औरत जाती की बराबरी हमारे लोकतंत्र और हमारे आजाद खयालोँ से कायम करनी थी, राष्ट्रपति निवास के सामने प्रदर्शन करके नहीं। मगर साफ़ हैं की आज हमारे आदिवासिओं के साथ-साथ, हमारी महिलाओं के लिए भी हमारा लोकतंत्र इन्साफ नहीं ला पाया हैं। मगर क्यो ?

भारत के लोकतंत्र ने कई सफलताएं हासिल की हैं। इंडिया के दलितो में सामजिक और आर्थिक परिवर्तन आया हैं। महिलायें भारी संख्या में पढ़े-लिखे और काम-काज करनेवालो में शामिल हुई हैं। एक बहुत विशाल, अत्यंत बहुरंगी मुल्क ने एक आजाद और लोकतांत्रिक राष्ट्र की पहचान पाई हैं। लेकिन कई पैमानो पर हमारा लोकतंत्र असफल भी रहा हैं। आज हमारा राष्ट्र समाज की बुराईयो से लड़ने की बजाएं समाज के खौफ में घुट रहा हैं।

इन असफलताओं के लिए कईं आकास्मिक और संरचनात्मक कारण हैं। भ्रष्ट नेता आकस्मिक कारण में गिने जायेंगे। मगर मैं यहाँ संरचनात्मक कारणो पर विश्लेषण करूंगा ।

हिंदुस्तान के रीती-रिवाज़ और हमारी विजातीय आबादी की वजह से महिलाओं की लैनागिकता (sexuality) पर समाज भारी पाबंदियां लगाता हैं। इंडिया की हर भाषा/धर्म/जाती पर आधारित हर कौम अपनी मर्दानगी के प्रदर्शन की ज़रुरत महसूस करती हैं। और हर कौम की ‘इज्ज़त’ महिलाओं के लैनागिक व्यवहार पर नियंत्रण रखने पर निर्भर करती हैं। सुसाध्य परिवारो में इसका अंजाम यह होता हैं की लड़कियो को अपने मनपसंद लड़के से शादी करने पर माँ-बाप के बहिष्कार का सामना करना पड़ता हैं, लेकिन कड़े परिवारो में ‘ऑनर किलिंग’ तक की जाती हैं। ज़ाहिर सी बात हैं की अगर कौम की ‘इज्ज़त’ स्त्रियो की लैनागिक ‘शुद्धता’ पर निर्भर करेगी, तो बलात्कार और यौन उत्पीडन, ख़ास तौर पर सामूहिक बलात्कार, कमज़ोर कौमो के खिलाफ एक हथ्यार बन जाते हैं। इसी वजह से सामूहिक बलात्कार भारत और पाकिस्तान मैं भारी मात्रा मैं होते हैं।

दूसरा संरचनात्मक कारण भारत के कुछ धार्मिक रिवाज़ हैं। हिंदुस्तान के सबसे बड़े मज़हब, हिन्दू धर्म और इस्लाम, औरतो पर भारी प्रतिबंध लगाते हैं। हिन्दू धर्म को दैवत्व के नारी प्रकार दिखाना का श्रेय तो ज़रूर मिलता हैं, लेकिन यह नारी प्रकार सिर्फ माँ के रूप मैं आती हैं। काली माँ, दुर्गा माँ, माता लक्ष्मी, माता पारवती, सरस्वती माँ … मैंने कभी किसीको शिव या विष्णु को शिव पिता या पिता विष्णु के नाम से सम्भोदित करते हुए नहीं सुना हैं। हिन्दू कथाओं और धर्मग्रंथो में स्वतन्त्र नारियां (जो किसीकी बहन, माँ या पतनी की भूमिका ना कर रही हो) कम देखने को मिलती हैं। जहाँ तक की इस्लाम का सावल हैं, डॉक्टर अम्बेडकर ने कहा हैं,

कोई शक की बात नहीं हैं की भारत के मुस्लिम समाज में वही खराबियां हैं जो हिन्दू समाज में हैं। बलकी, मुसलमानो मैं हिन्दुओं की खराबियां समेत कुछ और भी हैं। वोह हैं परदे की व्यवस्था।
कोई आसानी से देख सकता हैं की अगर महिलाओं को अपनी शकल भी दुनिया को दिखाने की अनुमति नहीं दी जाती हैं, तो और किसी तरह की आज़ादी का सवाल ही नहीं उठता।

तीसरा कारण, जो 1990s से काफी महत्वपूर्ण होगया हैं, वोह हैं मुक्त बाजारीक अर्थ व्यवस्था का दबाव और मीडिया उद्योग। इनकी वजह से औरतो का शरीर deodarant, शैम्पू, कपडे वाघ्येरा बेचने के लिए एक वस्तु बन गया हैं। काम-भावना हर जगह बिकती हैं। इसलिए कोई ताज्जुब की बात नहीं हैं की बॉलीवुड ने अपने नर दर्शको की लैंगिक दमित्ता का फायदा उठाने के लिए, चिकनी चमेली और मुन्नी बदनाम हुई जैसे साधनो का लगातार इस्तेमाल किया हैं। मुन्नी, चमेली और शीला का लोभ करने वाला हर आदमी यह सोचता हैं की यह किस्सी और की बहन या बीवी हैं, लेकिन शायद यह नहीं समझ पाता की बाकी मर्दों के लिए चमेली या शीला उसकी बहन या बेटी हो सकती हैं।

चौथा कारण भारत में लोकतंत्र का विकार और उसका मतलब सिर्फ चुनाविक लड़ाई बन जाना हैं। इस पर मैं काफिला ब्लॉग पर प्राची सिन्हा के लेख से एक वाक्यखण्ड प्रस्तुत करता हू ,

जब नारियो के खिलाफ हिंसा की बातचीत में वर्ग का मुद्दा उठता हैं, तो यह कहाँ जाता हैं की मर्द राज सारे वर्गों में लाबू हैं। लेकिन सच बात तो यह हैं की औरतो के खिलाफ अपराध झुग्गी झोपड़ियो में ज्यादा होते हैं। इस अलग दुनिया की महिलाओं को मध्य वर्ग की महिलाओं से अधिक खतरो का सामना करना पड़ता हैं। दर असल झुग्गियो की पूरी आबादी को इन इलाखो के गुंडो के डर मैं जीना पड़ता हैं, जिनकी  ऐसे अपराधो में शामिल होने की संभावना ज्यादा होती हैं।
मैं दस साल से शहर की झुग्गियो में गारिबो के साथ काम कर रही हु। और मैं यह दावे के साथ कह सकती हू की अगर इन गुंडो को झुग्गियो से हटा दिया जाये, तो गरीबी और गंदगी के बावजूद यह रहने के लिए बेहतर जगाएं बन जाएँगी। पर इन्हें कैसे निकाल सकते हैं ? आज हमारी राजनीतिक व्यवस्था ऐसी बन गयी हैं, की ऐसे गुंडे झुग्गियो मैं राजनितिक दलो की रीड की हड्डी बन चुके हैं। सियासी दलो के लिए यह गुंडे उस व्यवस्था के प्यादे हैं जो सीधे ऊपर तक पहुँचती हैं। हर राजनितिक दल जो सत्ता में आना चाहती हैं, वोह झुग्गियो में ऐसे गुंडो को पालती हैं। राज करनेवाले वर्ग झुग्गियो से तो दूर रहते हैं और इंडिया गेट के संसथान से राज करते हैं, लेकिन ऐसे पेचीदे जालो के द्वारा झुग्गियो से जुड़े होता हैं।

यह जाल हाल ही प्रदर्शित हुई दिबाकर बनेर्जी की फिल्म ‘शंघाई’ में खूबी से दिखाए गया हैं। कोई आश्चर्य की बात नहीं हैं की इस तरह की सियासी व्यवस्था राष्ट्र को हिंदुस्तानी नारियो की सहायता नहीं करने देगी।

अगर भारत की नारियो को इन्साफ दिलाना हैं तो कठोर दंड और ज्यादा निगरानी लाभदायक नहीं होन्गे। बल्कि यह हालातो को और बिगाड़ सकते हैं। पूर्व अमरीकी राष्ट्रपति बिल क्लिंटन ने कहा था की “कानोन का भय, उसकी निश्चिंतता पर आधारित हैं, उसकी कठोरता पर नहीं”। इन्साफ और बराबरी तभी मिलेगी जब राजनीति देश की जाती और धर्मं नहीं, उसकी समस्याओं के बारे में होगी, जब हिन्दुस्तानी अपने आप में मीडिया की चालबाजी और उसके भ्रष्टाचार को समझने की क्षमता बना पाएंगे, और जब लोग अपने समाज के शोशात्मक और प्रतिबंधक रीती-रिवाजो की खिलाफ खड़े होन्गे।

Posted by: Vikram | January 4, 2013

Why Indian democracy fails its women.

The Republic of India was not supposed to need the martyrdom of a young student, to make an incremental advance against deeply entrenched patriarchy. India’s democracy and liberalism were supposed to do that job. It is clear today that they havent. The question is why ?

India’s democracy has seen many successes. India’s oppressed Dalits have seen social and economic gains. Women have joined the educated classes and workforce in impressive numbers. A hugely diverse sub-continent has been imbued with a collective consciousness as a liberal, democratic nation. But on key parameters, Indian democracy has been a remarkable failure. Far from taking on the ills of society, the state today seems to be afraid of it and at times even complicit in perpetuating these ills.

Many contingent reasons can be given for the state’s failure to tackle patriarchy. Corrupt leaders and a morally deficient elite, both uncommitted to liberalism appear to be favorites for bashing by the media and middle class. But what are the deeper structural reasons for the state’s failure to deliver the promise of India to its women. There are many, they are very serious and there is very little being done to tackle most of them.

India’s traditions and its highly heterogenous population drives anxieties towards female sexuality. Each of the thousands of linguistic/religious/caste communities come with their own need for masculine projection, and community ‘honour’ is reposed in controlling female sexual behaviour. In benign cases, this leads to females facing parental boycott for marrying someone from outside their community, in extreme cases, we have the phenomenon of ‘honour killings’. Of course, if honour is contained in the sexual purity of female relatives and community members, sexual violence, especially gang-rapes become a potent weapon against marginalized communities. This is why the gang rape is so much more common in South Asia than other regions of the world.

The second structural factor is religious tradition. Both the major religions practiced in India, Hinduism and Islam, place enormous constraints on women. Hinduism deserves some credit for presenting female forms of divinity, however these divine forms are always maternal figures. Kali maa, Durga maa, Mata Laxmi, Mata Parvathy, Saraswati maa … I have never heard anyone address Shiva or Vishnu as Shiva pita or Pita Vishnu. Traditional Hindu myths and scriptures do not have much room for an independent woman. As for Islam, I quote Dr. Ambedkar,

There can thus be no manner of doubt that the Muslim Society in India is afflicted by the same social evils as afflict the Hindu Society. Indeed, the Muslims have all the social evils of the Hindus and something more. That something more is the compulsory system of purdah for Muslim women.

Not much room for female autonomy can be imagined if they are not permitted to even show their faces to the world.

The third factor, especially pertinent since the early 1990s, is the pressure of the free market and media industry. These result in the increased objectification of women to sell products. Sex sells, even in the more egalitarian societies of the West. It is hardly surprising that Bollywood has relied on a highly sexualized presentation of women to appeal to its sexually repressed male audience. In the guise of ‘liberation’, mainstream cinema in India has increasingly legitimized the sexual harassment and assault of women.

The fourth factor is the general breakdown of the democratic norm in India and the reduction of democracy to an electoral civil war. Prachee Sinha summarizes the effects this malformed democracy at the ground level in urban India at the blog Kafila,

When the class dimension emerges in the course of a discussion, it is commonplace to assert that patriarchy is equally entrenched in all classes. One often cites examples of rapes and other crimes against women that take place in the high society. But the fact remains that such crimes are more likely to happen in the slum habitat and the poor neighbourhoods. Women of this other world face such dangers far more than those from the middle class localities. In fact entire population of the slum habitat suffers under the oppression of the local goons and bullies who are more likely to be involved in such crimes.

Before it is taken as a sign of elite prejudice, let me say that I have been working with the urban poor in the slum habitat for nearly ten years. I can assert with some measure of confidence that were the goons and bullies to be taken away from the scene, slums will turn into incomparably better places despite the filth and poverty. But how can they be removed from the scene? They are the backbone of the political process in the slum habitat. They are the ground-support of the structure of political patronage that reaches all the way to the top. Every political party that aspires to become the ruling party has these elements as their representatives and functionaries in the slums. Ruling classes live far away from the slum habitat and rule from the institutions around the India Gate, but they have an intricate web of linkages extending all the way to the slums.

This web has been potrayed well in the recent Dibakar Banerjee movie ‘Shanghai‘. It is no surprise that this kind of political ecosystem will not allow the state to help Indian women end patriarchy.

In the fight to ‘make India safe for its women’ stricter punishments and increased surveillance are going to be of little use. They might even be counter-productive. Only when politics becomes about issues that truly affect the Indian people, when people are sufficiently media-literate to understand its manipulations and corruptions, and when people can critically evaluate their traditions and religious customs can ills like patriarchy and sexual violence be erased from India.

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